The firs t approach is termed moralizing . They define this as the "inculcation of the adult's values upon the young.'" They find two problems wi th this approach. In the first place, there are a number of conflicting sources tor value Input-parents, lhe church, the peer group, etc.; and the young do not know which source to use when determ ining their personal values. Secondly, moralizing results In a dichotomy between theory and practice, for the individual verbally accepts the value of the authority but does not carry the prescriptions out in actual practice.
Yet there Is a difference between moralizing and in· doctrination. Moralizing need not necessarily be lndoctri· nating. Likewise there Is a difference between an authority and authoritarian. Quite often we accept the opinions of authorllles without having those opinions inculcated In an Robert Craig Is chairman of the Department of Philosophy at St. Mary's College, Orchard Lake, Michigan.
Ec/uoallonal Considerations, Vol. 8, No. 3, Fall, 1981 authoritarian manner. In fact It Is often necessary to listen to the advice of experts such as clergymen and teachers, for their experience can aid us in making viable moral decisions. The term moralizing Is used in a pejorative sense by Sirpon and his friends, and this need not be the case. They never define the term, although they give examples of it.
We often say that a novel has a moral or we suggest that the moral to X type of behavior is such and such. This Is using the term moral in a positive sense, and the suggeslion is being made in ordinary discourse that it may be beneficial to learn from such moralizing. Thus moralizing need not be the indoctrinating affair Simon, et. al, say it is, and deriving morals from different sources Is a valuable me thod of values clarification .
Secondly, Simon suggests that some leachers and other adults adopt a laissez-faire atti tude loward the trans· mission of values. They base this laissez-faire attitude on the assumption thal values are relative and that the teacher or parent should not lnlervene In the process of value selection. The result of such a process, Simon suggests, is confusion and frustration on the part of the student. Without defending the laissez-faire position, it is evi· dent that it is closer to the values clarlflcatlon approach than Simon imagines. The laissez.faire approach is similar to the values clarification approach for two reasons.
1. The emphasis of values clarification is on ethical relativism-values reside within the Ind ividual; they are subjective. This characteris tic o f values clarlflcatlon will be crillclzed shOrtly.
2. Simon tells teachers not to intervene in the process o f value selection. The s tudents should be free to choose their own pre ferences without teacher intervention. This would seem to lead to the same confusion and frustration he claims is part o f the laissez-faire approach because the student would have no basis except his own preferences when deciding values. What II the student comes to the conclusion that smoking mariguane is morally acceptable. Shouldn't the teacher point out such facts (not moral opinions even, yet a type of justification nevertheless), that smoking It may be dangerous to the student's health, that it is against lhe law, that organized crime is often involved in lls growing and distribution, etc. Without teacher intervention how can the student make an intelligent moral decision. So lhe laissez-faire view which Simon condemns is Quite close to the values clarifi· c ation process he advocates; and there are numerous problems with his positive suggestions that sludent's values are subjective and that teac hers should nol intervene in the student valuing process.
The third notion o f valuing Simo n and his friends con· demn is modeling. This means that the teacher ought not to present himself or herself as a model for students to emulate, to describe modeling negatively. Simon again suggests that modeling leads to confusion because the student has so many models to choose from: parents, teachers, and so on. He even mentions movie stars as a positive source of modeling. The values o f some movie stars do not seem to be positive nor do they lend to the building up of the human community. They are material is· tic and individualistic. It IS unfor1una1e that Simon isn't more selective in his examples of modeling behavior.
What can we say about modeling as a method of values inculcation? First, there Is the work of Bandura and Walters on modeling in which they demonstrate that group modeling is a positive Instrument in changing negative behavior to that wh ich is more acceptable. When students experience another group exhibiting rewarding behavior they tend to want to emulate such behavior and to develop the positive values which accompany It. Second ly, the work o f Lawrence Kohlberg suggests that students viewing the moral reasons for action on the part of individuals at a higher moral stage than their own lnlult that the reasons and moral actions are actually preferable to their own. So they model the moral actions of those individuals at a higher moral level than their own. Lastly we can use our own experience to demonstrate that Simon is incorrect: that modeling has a part to play in moral growth. Haven't we all had teachers who were moral models for us so much so that w e desired to work harder in their classes to please them? Haven't there been adults who have been moral models to us and have helped our moral growth? This is largely an empirical question, but the answer is in the affirmative in this writers experience.
Lastly, let's examine some o f the aspects of the values clarification approach as enumerated by Simon. We will find thal both its theory and practice are misleading and even harmful. Philosophers have not come lo any agreement concerning the definition of the term value. The theories concerning the nature of value cover a wide area from natural law theories which view value as an objective property to an existentialistic ethic which sugges ts that values are personal choices. The values clarification people list seven criteria o f values which are supposed to cover its necessary and sufficient conditions. Valuing is composed of seven sub-processes.
1. prizing and cherishing 2. publicly affirming, when appropriate 3. choosing from alternatives Stewart's second criticism of the values clarification approach sugges ts that its proponents emphasize the content of values instead of the " relatively more important underlying structure of one's thin king and valuing ."• Content is concerned with what one thinks; structure Is concerned with why one th inks it. It is certainly the case that the cognitive developmental psychologists such as Piaget and Kohlberg see content and struc ture interrelating. The values clarification exponents abandon s tructure in place of content and much of the content dealt with is trivial at that.
Thirdly, Simon commits the error of separating content lrom process in his discussion of moral education. He identifies process with indoc trination and thus tries to 14 rely solely on the content of valuing. This contention is misleading at best.
Lately, it is evident that the values clarification pea· pie's theory is involved in ethical relativism, as was previously mentioned . This means that everyone is right about his or her values. Ultimately it leads to the view that only opinions and personal preferences matter in making moral judgments. Ethical relativism means that no values can be proven better than o thers; that disagreement about the rightness or wrongness of moral actions is to be avoided. If ethical relativism is true, the values o f Adolph Hitler are as defensible as the values of Jesus Christ. There is no way of telling which values are better than others; and the values clarification strategy leads to such a conclusion.
Two other problems with the values clarification approach are brought out by Alan Lockwood. He notes that the exponents fail to distinguish moral from non-moral issues. Thus students are asked to clarify their values o n such widespread issues as their favorite occupation to capitol punishment. Since a value is defined in relation to one's personal tastes and preferences there is no way of sorting out these preferences from issues or actions that affect the welfare of human beings. In other words, the dis tinction between moral and non-moral values collapses. As Lockwood says:
A decision to support policies invo lving the termination of human life Is different from a decision involv· Ing one's preference In entertainment. Decisions of the former type are moral value decisions, while the latter are non-moral value decisions.
• Lastly, many values clarification activities tend to jeopardize the private rights of students, for many of the strategies get students to disclose Information about themselves and their families. Much of this is private Information which could cause hostility in the family. Many ol the techniques of values clarification are of this nature and students are told to disclose anylhlng from their sexual preferences to their family relationships. In our age of mass information we are especially In need of privacy rights.
There is much more that could be said about the values clarification strategies. It is evident from the above that the values clarification program lacks a secure theo· retical foundation and that there is a paucity of research to support its use. It Is just another bandwagon educators have jumped on withou t thoroughly understanding Its Implications. It is true that moral education is extremely Important and that the schools should have a place in such education, but values clarification is not the way. 
